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INTRODUCTION
The failure of the Japanese economy to respond to aggressive monetary easing in the form of a zero bid rate on the
Bank of Japan's overnight financing facility has reminded some economists of Hicks's IS-LM rendition of Keynes's
"liquidity trap". Those who use Hicks's famous diagram as the point of reference for evaluating monetary policy will
recall that at some low rate of interest the horizontal portion of the LM curve emanating from the vertical axis is
meant to represent the lack of influence of expanding the money supply on the rate of interest; monetary policy thus
does not shift the intersection of the LM curve with the IS curve that determines the equilibrium level of output. Since
monetary policy has no impact on the level of output along this horizontal portion of the LM curve, debt financing of
government expenditure remains the only policy capable of influencing output. The explanation that is given of the
failure of monetary policy is that interest rates are so low that they cannot be reduced further. In the case of Japan,
since moving rates below their current zero bid rate would mean negative rates, it is considered to be the first known
example of an economy facing a liquidity trap.
Those who have studied Keynes's original exposition of the influence of changes in the quantity of money on the level of
output will recall that there "may be several slips between the cup and the lip" (JMK:VII, p. 173) and that his theory of
liquidity preference, which is the foundation for the liquidity trap as an expression of total liquidity preference,
challenged the simple mechanical relationship between money creation, the price level and the nominal level of economic
activity that is the basis of the traditional quantity theory. It is paradoxical that the theoretical explanation of the way
in which the liquidity trap is currently producing recession in the Japanese economy is founded on quantity theory
models in which the rate of expansion of the quantity of money directly determines the rate of change in the price level.
Indeed, in canonical quantity theory models money is neutral and has no impact on the long-run equilibrium of real
output, irrespective of any reference to a liquidity trap, since money only affects nominal variables. The failure of a
positive rate of change in the quantity of money to reverse the decline in the price level in these traditional quantity
theory models is considered to be equivalent to the failure of expansionary money policy to reduce the rate of interest
in Keynes's explanation of the liquidity trap. 
This apparent contradiction is resolved once it is recognised that the liquidity trap in these neo-quantity theory models
is seen as an expression of the failure of changes in the quantity of money to influence the "real" rate of return. Thus,
with the nominal rate of interest bounded at zero, the real rate of interest can only be reduced if prices are rising. If on
the contrary prices are falling, then the real rate is rising, and if the Central Bank is nonetheless increasing the money
supply and prices are not responding, then the real rate is not falling and the economy is said to be in a liquidity trap
since monetary policy has no influence on the real rate. 
The explanation for the existence of the liquidity trap is then the failure of money growth to raise prices as postulated
by the traditional quantity theory. This failure is not explained by any shortcomings in the theory, but by the failure of
the Central Bank to make credible its intention to produce inflation. After decades of urging Central Banks to adopt
independent policies and to create credibility in their pledge to keep prices stable by tying their hands and other sorts
of sadistic practices, it is now argued that in Japan it is precisely the strength of this credibility that makes the
attempt to create inflation incredible. Paradoxically, the current policy prescription for the Bank of Japan is to make its
commitment to price stability incredible in order to convince market participants that it will produce a rate of inflation
in nominal output that it sufficient to reduce the real rate of interest to the level that causes domestic savings to fall
to the near zero level of real domestic investment expenditures. The modern explanation of liquidity preference is not only couched in the quantity theory tradition, it is based on Irving
Fisher's version of the theory in which the nominal rate of interest is determined by the real rate of return adjusted for
the rate of change in the price level. If instead of rising, the price level is falling then nominal rates will have to be below
real rates of return and equilibrium may even require negative nominal interest rates if the real rate is less than the
deflation rate. But, if nominal rates are bounded from below at zero, then nominal interest rates cannot be adjusted
downwards below zero; then the only way to restore savings-investment equilibrium is to reverse the deflation with a
policy of inflation. This is precisely the policy that Fisher urged on Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression in the
United States. It was also the basis of the decision to devalue the dollar by raising the price of gold and the various
measures to create the "alphabet soup" US government agencies designed to put floors under domestic prices. The
inflation policy that Paul Krugman is recommending for Japan is based on exactly the same principles as Irving Fisher's
recommendations during the Great Depression.
Although mainstream economists have long been sceptical of the existence of the Keynesian liquidity trap, Krugman
claims to have provided analytical support for the concept within both Hicks's ISLM model and more rigorous traditional
theory. This paper will thus start by comparing Keynes's original explanation with Hicks's version, and then with Fisher's
theory. A final section will assess similarities and differences in terms of the policy that Krugman has recommended
for Japan.
HICKS'S HORIZONTAL LM CURVE AS LIQUIDITY TRAP
Hicks not only claimed to be "a convinced liquidity preference man" (JMK:XIV, p. 83), he also claimed that "Keynes
accepted the IS-LM diagram as a fair statement of his position" (Hicks, 1977, p. 146) However, Keynes was not an
uncritical reader of Hicks's exposition of his theory in the Economic Journal  review of the General Theory  and the
subsequent derivation of the now famous IS-LL (as it was originally called) diagram. In particular, Keynes notes that
Hicks inserted two illicit assumptions concerning the elasticity of supply of consumption goods and the income elasticity
of the rate of interest in his discussion. Both were important to the derivation of the horizontal portion of the LM curve
that represents the liquidity trap for most economists, but both were extraneous to Keynes's theory.
In his review Hicks notes that even if one accepts Keynes's multiplier proposition that an increase in investment will
cause a rise in demand for consumption goods and thus a multiplied increase in aggregate income, the empirical
magnitude of the increase in real output will be small if the elasticity of supply of consumption goods is low. Hicks thus
concludes that Keynes must be implicitly assuming "a high elasticity of supply in the consumption goods industries ... ;
and if things do work out this way, it is perfectly intelligible that the increased demand for loans from the investment
industries should encounter an increased supply, so that there is no reason for the rate of interest to rise" (Hicks, CEII,
pp. 89-91) when investment and output increase. The idea is that the increased output of consumption goods will
produce the increased savings necessary to fund the loans for the new investment expenditures. 
Hicks also argues that if the supply of consumption goods is inelastic during the expansive phase of the cycle: "Mr.
Keynes's analysis of this case would evidently lead to the conclusion that there would be an indefinite rise in the prices
of consumption goods ... but he would admit, on second thoughts, that this would lead to a more or less corresponding
rise in the demand for money; and therefore that, unless the supply of money was indefinitely expanded, the rate of
interest must rise ... I do not think that this differs essentially from what has been said by earlier writers [Hicks refers
in a footnote to Hayek's Prices and Production ]; they would, however, begin by assuming the supply of money not
indefinitely expansible, and so proceed straight to the rise in the rate of interest. But they would admit, on their second
thoughts, that if the supply of money were to be indefinitely expanded, the rate of interest could be kept down, and the
inflation proceed without limit." (Hicks: CEII, pp. 93-4). 
Thus, Hicks concludes that Keynes is assuming either a highly elastic supply of consumption goods or an infinitely
elastic supply of money and that it is one or the other of these assumptions which allows Keynes's theory to differ
from the traditional explanation of the response of the rate of interest to an increase in the level of activity. Thus,
Hicks's explanation of the stability of the rate of interest in the face of an increase in investment and output, which
becomes the horizontal range of the LM curve, is based on the assumption of either a high elasticity of supply of
consumption goods (implicitly loanable funds)or of money.
Keynes, however, rejects any dependence of his theory on the elasticity of supply: "you argue ... that my argument
depends on the assumption of a `high elasticity of supply of consumption goods', but why high" ... "Towards the end you
speak of the imperfect elasticity of supply of consumption goods in a trade cycle leading to a `consequent hardening of
interest rates.' I do not follow why the one is consequent on the other" (JMK:XIV, p.71, 72). In answer to this criticism
Hicks agrees that the elasticity of supply need only be greater then zero and then goes on "Surely it is quite in
accordance with your own theory to speak of the imperfect elasticity of supply of consumption goods in the trade cycle
leading to a consequent hardening of interest rates. As investment increases , the prices of consumption goods rise;
this raises the transaction demand for money, and if the supply of money is not perfectly elastic, interest rates mustrise too . The same thing may indeed happen to some extent merely by increasing employment, even if the supply of
consumption goods is perfectly elastic, but imperfect elasticity of supply intensifies it. Is not this orthodox?" (JMK:XIV,
p. 73 italics added). Keynes agrees that this is orthodox, but not his own theory, replying "I quite misunderstood what
you meant ... I quite agree with what you say" (Ibid., p. 75).
The reader will note that this discussion confuses two separate points. Hicks's initial statement concerned the low
probability of a rise in the rate of interest increasing saving out of a given income in order to balance the failure of the
consumption goods industries to expand in step with increased investment, the same effect being produced by an
elastic supply of consumption goods keeping prices constant and allowing the required increase in the supply of saving.
What Hicks had in mind was presumably the availability of stocks to allow the operation of the temporal multiplier
process without raising prices. 
The second argument, on the other hand, refers to the impact of higher consumption goods prices in increasing the
demand for money and thus raising interest rates, even when the multiplier is able to proceed without encountering
supply shortages. Thus it is the assumption of the infinitely elastic supply of money which is crucial to the presumed
constant rate of interest. But this proposition Keynes clearly accepted as being consistent with classical theory, and as
such was not a distinguishing feature of this own theory or of any relation to the liquidity trap as defined above.
Having agreed that in his theory, as in any other, an increase in investment would in general cause an increase in output
and probably prices and, via an increase in transactions demands for money an increase in the rate of interest,
irrespective of the value of the elasticity of supply above zero, Keynes must have been perplexed by Hicks's statement
in the article that set out the IS-LL analysis, "Mr Keynes and the Classics", that Keynes's theory leads to the "startling
conclusion, that an increase in the inducement to invest, or in the propensity to consume, will not  tend to raise the
rate of interest, but only to increase employment" (Hicks: CEII, p. l07, italics supplied) and that "the most important
thing  in Mr Keynes's book" is that "It is not only possible to show that a given supply of money determines a certain
relation between Income and interest (which we have expressed here by the curve LL) it is also possible to say
something about the shape of the curve. It will probably tend to be nearly horizontal on the left, and nearly vertical on
the right" (Ibid., p. 109, italics supplied), implying that the rate of interest would not rise as investment and output
expanded until full employment was reached. But, given the above discussion the horizontal behaviour of the LL curve
"on the left" could only take place even in the presence of a perfectly elastic supply of money, while its behaviour "on
the right" could only result from a less than perfectly elastic supply of money. 
Keynes was quick to note his disagreement with Hicks's clearly ad hoc representation of the behaviour of the rate of
interest as the "most important thing" in Keynes's theory: "From my point of view it is important to insist that my
remark is to the effect that an increase in the inducement to invest need not raise the rate of interest. I should agree
that, unless the monetary policy is appropriate, it is quite likely to. In this respect I consider that the difference
between myself and the classicals lies in the fact that they regard the rate of interest as a non-monetary phenomenon,
so that an increase in the inducement to invest would raise the rate of interest irrespective of monetary policy "
(JMK:XIV, p. 80, italics added).
Thus Keynes rejects the argument that the difference between his theory and the Classics lies in the restrictions
placed on the money supply function, in particular the existence of a horizontal portion usually known as the "liquidity
trap" or in any restriction on the elasticity of supply. Keynes clearly stated that liquidity trap conditions, while possible,
had not yet been experienced; they thus could not not serve as an explanation for the Great Depression. Nonetheless,
Hicks's formulation of liquidity preference led to a presentation of Keynes's theory which implicitly required either 1)
the operation of the liquidity trap due to the elasticity of supply of money, or 2) the assumption of unchanging prices of
consumption goods, for a horizontal LM curve represented stable prices in conditions of perfectly elastic supply of
consumption goods. However, the IS-LM framework makes no reference to any supply conditions for money or
consumption goods output, only the supply of savings. Even though this representation was never accepted by Keynes --
Hicks's suggestions to the contrary -- it has become the standard representation. Tobin, for example comments "In
terms of the Hicksian language ... I thought (and I still think) ... the main issue ...is the shape of the LM locus" (Tobin,
1972, p. 853). Indeed, both Friedman and Tobin accept a positive slope for the LM curve, rejecting a vertical or
horizontal curve. But, as Hicks's article pointed out, here there is no difference between Keynes's and the "ordinary
method of economic theory." Clearly, Hicks's explanation of the liquidity trap as the horizontal portion of the LM curve
is consistent with traditional theory, as Keynes agreed. But it cannot be considered as an analytical foundation for the
failure of the rate of interest to respond to policy changes in the amount of base money created by the central bank
for it deals with the behaviour of rates when output is increasing with perfectly elastic money supply, not the behaviour
of rates when the quantity of money is increasing with perfectly elastic supply of output.
THE MODERN THEORY OF THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
Although Krugman considers Hicks's model as a "very useful heuristic" (Krugman, p. 7) he notes that it is considered
too ad hoc and thus not the best vehicle for presenting the traditional version of the liquidity trap. In his view "Aliquidity trap may be defined as a situation in which conventional monetary policies have become impotent, because
nominal rates are at or near zero - so that injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect, because base and
bonds are viewed by the private sector as perfect substitutes." He notes that an alternative "way of stating the
liquidity trap problem is to say that it occurs when the equilibrium real interest rate, the rate at which savings and
investment would be equal at potential output, is negative" (op. cit., p. 16) As noted above, in traditional theory, if the
nominal interest rate is determined by adjusting the real rate of return for depreciation in the monetary standard a rise
in the inflation rate, given the nominal rate should cause the real rate to decline. If a rise in the growth of base money
causes a rise in the rate of inflation, then it should be possible for monetary policy to achieve the required equilibrium
real rate. This raises the question of , "how is the liquidity trap possible? The answer lies in a little-noticed escape
clause in the standard argument for monetary neutrality: ... there is no ... argument that says that a rise in the money
supply that is not expected to be sustained  will raise prices equiproportionally - or indeed at all. In short, to approach
the question from this level of abstraction already suggests that a liquidity trap involves a kind of credibility problem ...
if monetary expansion does not work, if there is a liquidity trap, it must be because the public does not expect it to be
sustained" (op. cit. p. 7). Although a one-shot increase in base money will lead to a once over increase in the price level,
this should have no impact on the rate of inflation and leave the nominal rate of interest unchanged if the real rate of
interest is unchanged. The liquidity trap thus occurs because the central bank cannot make individuals with rational
expectations believe that it will keep money growing in perpetuum at the new higher rate so as to ensure a higher rate
of inflation in perpetuum. 
This looks just the opposite of Hicks's theory, which is based on stable prices of consumer goods and belief in the
perfect elasticity of the money supply. Krugman argues that investors do not believe that the money supply will be
perfectly elastic, indeed the increases that occur in the present period will be reversed in future. Thus, monetary policy
cannot influence the real rate of interest to make it adjust to the level that will lower private sector savings to equality
with the voluntary investment decisions of the private sector. "The easiest way to think about this is to say that there
is an equilibrium real  interest rate which the economy will deliver whatever the behaviour of nominal prices." (op. cit, p.
10) Thus, the liquidity trap occurs because the real rate cannot be influenced by monetary policy. 
As already noted, this is a perfectly standard result within Fisher's version of the quantity theory and formed the basis
for Keynes's belief that Hicks had not captured his essential difference from classical theory: "Put shortly, the
orthodox theory maintains that the forces which determine the common value of the marginal efficiency of various
assets are independent of money, which has, so to speak, no autonomous influence; and that prices move until the
marginal efficiency of money, i.e. the rate of interest, falls into line with the common value of the marginal efficiency
of other assets as determined by other forces. My theory, on the other hand, maintains that this is a special case and
that over a wide range of possible cases almost the opposite is true, namely, that the marginal efficiency of money is
determined by forces partly appropriate to itself, and that prices move until the marginal efficiency of other assets fall
into line with the rate of interest" (JMK:XIV, p. 101). 
LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE AND THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
Krugman notes that unlike Hicks's ad hoc version his explanation of the liquidity trap depends on the modern theory of
intertemporal choice. But, it is precisely in the exposition of this intertemporal relation that Keynes differed from
Fisher. Fisher's explanation -- which is the one used by Krugman -- of the determination of nominal interest rates is
based on expectations of future goods prices relative to present goods prices as expressed in the expected rate of
inflation or deflation of goods prices. The theory is based on a proposition presented in Irving Fisher's The Theory of
Interest  (1930) which on Fisher's own admission only applied to conditions in which "rational tendencies", based on
"rational and empirical laws ... analogous to rational and empirical laws of physics and astronomy" (Fisher, 1930, p.
321). However, Fisher notes that where actuarial risk cannot be applied and "uncertain" conditions make the value of
money unstable, "We must ... give up as a bad job any attempt to formulate completely the influences which really
determine the rate of interest" (ibid). These are precisely the conditions which Keynes believed to be normal and thus
the basis for this theory. 
Both Fisher and Keynes specify the rate of interest as an intertemporal relationship represented by a spot-forward
swap, or by the excess of the forward price over the par or spot price. However, In Fisher's time  preference approach
the rate of interest is the discount of future over present income that makes their utility equal at the margin, while for
Keynes liquidity  preference represents the return that must be paid on illiquid assets to make investors indifferent to
holding more liquid assets. 
Since time preference is a relation between real income today and in the future, it would be disturbed by changes in
relative prices, thus Fisher argues that the money rate of interest that allows individuals to transfer income from the
present to the future, r, must be corrected for the rate of inflation, p, in order to leave the time transformation of
income undisturbed: thus the Fisher relation: 
(1+p)(1+r) = (1+i), and i = [(1+r)(1+p)]- 1 = 1 + r + p + rp -1 which is usually written >i = r + p when rp is small and p is the rate of inflation, r the rate of increase in real income, and i the rate of interest
on money. 
In the case of Japan, the problem is not inflation, but deflation, and p < 0. Then if i is constrained to be non-negative, r
must be positive and it is impossible for the competitive market system to achieve an equilibrium which requires r to be
negative. In simple terms this is Krugman's version of the liquidity trap. In Krugman's simple monetary view, p should be
determined by the rate of growth of base money; but if money growth is indeed positive and p remains negative this can
only be explained by the expectation that money growth will not remain positive and the expansionary monetary policy
will be reversed in the medium run. Thus the system is stuck in a liquidity trap with a real rate of interest that is too
high, or a nominal rate of interest that is too high, because the rate of inflation is too low when nominal interest rates
are fixed at zero. The reason can only be the failure of the central bank to convince the public that p will be
permanently higher. Overcoming the liquidity trap thus requires permanent and perfectly anticipated inflation in the
form of a positive value of p sufficient to allow r to be negative when i is constrained to be non-negative.
Keynes has a very simple objection to Fisher's relation between the rate of interest and the rate of inflation. First, pace
Krugman's emphasis on the lack of central bank credibility, he objected because it relied on the assumption of perfect
foresight over the path of future incomes and prices (cf.1930, pp. 202-3 and JMK:VII pp. 142-3). Second, he objected
because Fisher's argument that the money rate of interest should automatically reflect a perfectly foreseen rise or fall
in the price level overlooks the impact of a rise or fall in interest rates on the capital value of existing stocks of
financial assets. While it is true that if a rise in the price level for the coming year of 2% is perfectly foreseen, interest
rates must be 2% higher to keep real returns for investors in one-year bills constant, the same would not be true for an
investor holding fixed-interest assets of longer maturity in order to sell after one year, since there would be a positive
or negative change in its capital value if interest rates change. Since market arbitrage should ensure that the one- year
holding period rate of return should be the same for any instrument (even 30-year bonds sold one year after purchase)
held for one year, longer-dated instruments should have a larger adjustment in their interest rates to offset the fall in
capital value due to the rise in interest rates. A change in the rate of inflation should then have a differential impact on
the rate of interest along the maturity spectrum, rising with time to maturity. 
Keynes noted that a rise in the rate of interest from 10% to 12.2% will cause the price of a £100 par value British
consol paying a £10 coupon to fall from £100 to £81.96, a decline of 1.8% and a capital loss of over £18. While the
"variations in the rate of interest earned during the year in question are too small to make much difference" (e.g. the
extra 2.2% earned on the reinvestment of the £10 coupon) relative to the much more substantial capital loss since the
benefit of being able to invest the future £10 interest coupon payments at the higher rate of 12.2% will be swamped by
the £18 decline in the capital value of the bond. The rise in the rate of interest equal to the rise in the rate of inflation
could by no means be considered as sufficient to compensate for the loss in purchasing power. Thus, Keynes argues,
Fisher's relation goes in the wrong direction for existing bondholders, since the higher yields required to preserve real
yields cause capital losses that will more than offset the increased interest earnings. 
What change in the rate of interest would be required to keep the capital position of the bond holder unchanged? Since
the impact of the rate of interest will increase interest earned on reinvestment of coupon interest, while it changes
capital values in the opposite direction, the breakeven condition for a perpetual bond will be  P-C=0, where  P is the
annual cumulative change in price, and C its annual coupon payment. The price, or present value, of a perpetual bond is
C/i, where 'i' is its current yield to maturity and C the annual coupon. The change in price  P of a perpetual bond is given
by the product of its market price, the change in the rate of interest,  i, and the modified duration of the bond. For a
perpetual bond duration is given by D = (1+i)/i, and modified duration by D/(1+i), which simplifies to 1/r. Thus  P = P * 
i * MD, which can be expressed  P = (C/i) *  i * (1/i) =  i * (C/i2 ). Substituting in  P-C=0 gives  i * (C/i2) - C = 0
which simplifies to  i = i2 as the condition under which  P=C and is Keynes's square rule. Thus, for increases in the rate
of interest equal to the increase in the rate of inflation to leave capital values unchanged they must be equal to i2.
Thus, the Fisher relation will hold only for an increase in the rate of inflation  p = i2, but this only keeps capital values
constant and does not provide any adjustment for inflation. For the Fisher relation to hold, interest rates must rise by
more than this, but this means that capital value will fall further, etc, which illustrates Keynes's point that in general it
is impossible for a simple adjustment in the interest rate to keep purchasing power unchanged once the impact of the
interest rate on the value of existing stocks of assets is taken into account. There is thus no reason to expect the
Fisher relation to hold, as has indeed turned out to be the case empirically.
But, Keynes's calculation also served another purpose. It can also be represented as the "breakeven" point for the two
opposing forces working on the value of the bond, that is, the point at which the change in capital value is just offset by
the opposite change in interest income from reinvesting coupon interest at the higher or lower interest rate over the
remaining time to maturity of the bond. This point is called the "duration" of the bond in the finance literature. The
lower the rate of interest, the higher the bond's "duration", and the longer it takes to recover the fall in capital values
from the increased reinvestment earnings due to higher reinvestment interest rates. At a 3% nominal interest rate,duration is 34.33 years, at 2% to 51 years. At 1% it is 101 years. Keynes's explanation of the liquidity trap is based on
this relation. If an investor has to wait 101 years to recover the capital loss due to a rise in the rate of interest equal
to 1% squared, which is only an absolute increase in rates from 1% to 1.01%, it seems rational for the investor to
decide that it would be better not to hold bonds, but to hold money instead since the loss in holding money is only the
interest rate, while the loss from holding the bond is the much larger decline in capital value. Thus, on Keynes's
definition the liquidity trap will occur whenever investors expect interest rates to rise by more than the square of the
current interest rate, for they will then prefer to hold money rather than bonds. Thus Keynes's statement that the
lower the rate of interest, the more likely that liquidity trap will be sprung, since the longer it takes to recoup the
capital loss through higher interest earnings and thus the higher the probability there will be a reversal in interest
rates. 
Since liquidity preference is a relative concept, it should be clear that the existence of a liquidity trap at high interest
rates cannot be ruled out. At 8%, duration is 13.5 years and modified duration, 12.5 years. A rise in the rate of
interest to .0864 would produce a fall in the price of a par 8% consol of 100*12.4*.0064 = £8 which is exactly the
coupon value. An expectation of a rise in interest rates of more than 8% then should lead to a decision to sell bonds for
money. If this expectation is generally held by investors then there will be no buyers of bonds other than the monetary
authority and it will be impossible to change interest rates by buying bonds from the public since there is perfectly
elastic supply at prevailing interest rates. The expected percentage rise in interest is however, twice as high as in the
case of 4% rates. However, these should be judged relative to recent changes in bond prices. If 8% lies within two
standard deviations from the mean of rate changes over the recent past, then it would be just as rational to remain
liquid at 8% as it was at 4% in similar conditions of volatility. It is clear that the liquidity trap depends on expectations
of future bond prices, and that expectations will be based on recent volatility of rates. In a volatile rate environment, it
will become more difficult to use changes in interest rates to influence the demand for money since they will have to be
larger in order to produce an impact.
It is also important to remember, as noted above, Keynes's argument refers primarily to the impact on long rates, or
more precisely on the range of rates of assets of different maturities as represented by the yield curve. Of course,
the argument given above concerns the impact of changes in short rates on the prices of assets of all maturities.
Thus, Keynes notes that "If the monetary authority deals only in short-term debts, we have to consider what influence
the price, actual and prospective, of short-term debts exercises on debts of longer maturity" (JMK:VII, p. 206).
Thus, the existence of the Keynesian liquidity trap does not depend on the absolute level of the interest rate, but on the
size of the value of the square of the interest rate relative to the historic volatility of the interest rate and the
uniformity of expectations concerning increases in interest rates in excess of this rate. It is also clear that it does not
depend on the lack of credibility of the central bank in producing inflation, for even if the central bank's pledge to raise
the inflation rate were credible and believed by the public, it would also have to induce the credible belief that there
would be no upward shift in the entire yield curve as a result. As a result, Keynes recommends "Perhaps a complex
offer by the central bank to buy and sell at stated prices gilt-edged bonds of all maturities, in place of the single bank
rate for short-term bills, is the most important practical improvement which can be made in the technique of monetary
management" (ibid) capable of overcoming the liquidity trap. 
Although investors in Japanese securities may believe in the ability of the central bank to set the rate of growth of the
money supply and/or its short term policy rate, they certainly do not believe that the central bank can control the
shape of the yield curve. This would be particularly improbable given the changes that have taken place in ten-year
rates since the Japanese Central Bank adopted its zero rate policy. Thus, even if investors have perfect confidence in
the Central Bank's ability to increase the rate of inflation, the existence of a zero bid rate means that there is a zero
probability of a further fall in rates short rates, making the expected value of the change in short rates positive. As
long as there is a uniform market expectation that interest rates would rise by more than the square of themselves,
the expectation is that long rates will rise by more than this and the failure of the economy to respond to monetary
policy will remain (although the actual existence of a liquidity trap could only be confirmed if the Central Bank did
attempt to influence long rates). 
From a Keynesian point of view, Krugman's policy cannot work for a credible central bank policy for inflation would have
to create perfect certainty not only that short term interest rates would not rise, but that the yield curve would
remain stationary. In current Japanese conditions it is extremely unlikely that such conditions could be created.
Government bond issuance has increased dramatically along with the rising government expenditure packages that have
been introduced in response to the slump. The largest proportion (around 40% of existing stocks) of these bonds have
gone into the portfolios of government agencies such as the Trust Fund Bureau (TFB). The next largest proportion went
into bank portfolios (around a quarter). This shift was facilitated by what is called the "dual flight to quality" that has
occurred in the post bubble period. in which the weakness of the banks caused households to shift from risky bank
deposits to government guaranteed postal deposits (and the newly introduced ten year compound interest bearing
savings accounts) which provided the funds for the TFB which invests in government securities. The weakness in the
corporate sector caused a sharp fall in bank lending to the private sector, and banks increased their holdings ofgovernment securities in their reduced balance sheets. 
In the end of 1998 and early 1999 two important structural changes took place which are quite independent of the
credibility of the Central bank's inflation policy. First, as part of Japan's financial liberalisation, banks will be required to
mark their investment portfolios to market. The duration of a ten year bond issued at a 1% current yield is above 9.5
years. Any increase in long rates, such as the jump from around 1% to 2.25% that occurred during the last quarter of
1998 would produce a decline of around 12% in the value of the 1% par bonds in bank portfolios. For conditions
prevailing in February 1999 it has been estimated that a 100 basis point rise in interest rates on long bonds would have
produced a 15 trillion Yen capital loss for all financial holders of Japanese government bonds. It is thus likely that banks
will be reducing their portfolio holdings of bonds, causing falling prices.
Further, the TFB announcement that it would reduce its purchases of securities from the 25 trillion Yen in fiscal 1998
to less than half (in January of 1999 it was only 5 trillion on an annual basis) because of maturing postal term deposits
and the elimination of the requirement that postal deposits and pension contribution be held by the Bureau,
concentrated the market's attention on the importance of public bond market management on supply conditions. It is
quite clear that the continued financial liberalisation will reduce the holdings by government agencies, and that banks will
reduce their portfolio holdings as the volatility of bond prices increases. Finally, banks will be given permission to raise
funds through bond issues from the last half of fiscal 1999. All of these factors put a sustained upward pressure on
term interest rates. This also means that banks will not only be unwilling to buy bonds, they will be hesitant to lend to
finance private sector holdings of bonds or productive enterprise. In these conditions the market will suffer from
continued fears of a steepening of the yield curve and the associated capital losses associated with holding long-term
issues. Since there must be equivalence between short issues and long issues with short holding periods, this will mean
continued upward pressure on short rates. Thus, the policy that the central bank would have to adopt in order to
eliminate the risk of a rise in rates according to the square rule would be to peg long rates, much as was done in the US
in the second world war (cf. IBJ Securities, 1999). This, however, does not seem likely for a Central bank that was just
granted its independence in the context of big bang liberalisation. 
Clearly, in present conditions it is not the lack of a credible inflation policy, but a credible interest rate policy that is
creating difficulty. As Keynes notes in relation to Fisher's recommendations of inflating out of the Great Depression:
"The stimulating effect of the expectation of higher prices is due, not to its raising the rate of interest (that would be
a paradoxical way of stimulating output --in so far as the rate of interest rises, the stimulating effect is to that extent
offset), but to its raising the marginal efficiency of a given stock of capital" (JMK:VII, p. 143) that is, raising the
expectation of returns on new investment relative to the rate of interest, and this requires a credible policy that
interest rates will not rise along with the rate of inflation, which is to say that the Fisher relation and the quantity
theory should not hold. But the failure of a higher rate of increase in the quantity of money to increase prices and the
rate of interest is what Krugman calls the liquidity trap and he identifies as the cause of Japan's recession. In Japan
even if the Bank of Japan could mount a credible inflation policy, there would be no guarantee of the stability of the yield
curve. What is required is a credible policy to ensure increased higher rates of return on investment, which may or may
not be accompanied by rising prices. In general in Japan it has not. This requires credible increases in aggregate demand.
Traditionally in Japan this has come from exports. Given recent Yen strength and other structural changes in global
markets this is now unlikely. What Japan needs is a credible policy of increasing the return on producing for domestic
demand. From a Keynesian point of view it might be more appropriate to say that Japan is in an underemployment
equilibrium with deficient aggregate demand than in a liquidity trap.
NOTES 
1. Although it is interesting to note that interbank deposit bid rates were in fact less than zero during 1998. 
2. Cf. Joan Robinson's comment on this aspect of Hicks's Review (1937, p. 16): "There appears to be no warrant for Mr.
Hicks' view ... that an indefinitely great rise of prices will develop in a state where capacity is limited but available labour
unemployed. It is true, as Mr. Hicks says, that when effective demand increases and the supply of money is constant,
the rate of interest will rise if the supply of consumption goods is less than perfectly elastic, so that prices rise. But it
will rise even if supply is perfectly elastic and prices are constant". 
3. "I know of no example of it hitherto" p. 207 
Keynes always notes that his argument refers to "the objective of reducing the long-term rate of interest" (p. 202) or
"a determinate rate of interest or, more strictly, a determinate complex of rates of interest for debts of different
maturities." p. 205. He lists one of the reasons (in addition to the liquidity trap) why central banks have difficulty
influencing the rate of interest as "the monetary authority's own practices in limiting it willingness to deal to debts of a
particular type" p. 207, and that "owing to the unwillingness of most monetary authorities to deal boldly in debts of long
term there has not been much opportunity for a test [of the liquidity trap]" ibid. It is thus the influence on the
long-term rate of interest that is crucial, but we would now talk in terms of affecting the slope of the yield curve. 4. The duration of a par perpetual bond with a £4 coupon is 26 years. Modified duration, defined as D/(1+I), which
measures the volatility of bond prices, is 25 years. The change in the price of the 4% par consol is thus calculated by
multiplying modified duration by the current price and the change in the bond's yield to maturity. In the case of a 16
basis point (4 basis points squared) rise in the yield from .04 to .0416, the value of the bond will fall over the year by
25*100*.0016 = £4, which is precisely the bond coupon. For any greater increase in interest rates, the fall in the
bond's value will exceed the current coupon of the bond, producing net losses for the holder. If an investor expects
interest rates to rise by more than the square of the current rate Keynes says the investor should prefer to hold cash
rather than bonds. In such conditions, attempts to lower the rate of interest by increasing the purchase of bonds will
find ready sellers at the prevailing interest rate, and the attempts of the monetary authority to lower rates will be
prevented by a "liquidity trap". 
5. As rates rise, the square rule produces larger and larger absolute changes in the interest rate, and the use of
modified duration to calculate the change in price becomes less and less accurate. The full calculation of the change in
the bond price will require the calculation of convexity. It is interesting to note that Hicks, 1939, p. 261, note 2,
reproduces the square rule, and notes that it is very likely that returns will be negative, since the fall in capital values
will be even greater if changes in risk are taken into account. 
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